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Somebody Call My Doctor:
Repeal of the Treating Physician Rule in
Social Security Disability Adjudication
CHARLES TERRANOVA†
INTRODUCTION
Millions of Americans depend on disability benefits
programs managed by the Social Security Administration
(“SSA”). In the mid-2010s, an uptick in applications and
administrative appeals sparked a crisis for both the Agency
and program beneficiaries.1 Although a sizeable percentage
of the federal budget is dedicated to Social Security, funding
has failed to keep pace with the rising number of claims.2 As
a result, administrative law judges (“ALJs”) face crushing
backlogs of cases,3 and claimants wait in line for nearly two

† J.D. Candidate, University at Buffalo School of Law.
1. Terrence McCoy, 597 Days. And Still Waiting., WASH. POST (Nov. 20,
2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/local/2017/11/20/10000-people-diedwaiting-for-a-disability-decision-in-the-past-year-will-he-be-next/?utm_term=.
d981cbd003a8 (stating that 10,000 people died while waiting for a decision on a
disability benefits claim).
2. See id. (describing the budget as “stagnant”).
3. Jonah B. Gelbach & David Marcus, Crushed, JUDICATURE, Autumn 2017,
at 65, 66 (“To forestall an intolerable backlog, the Social Security Administration
expects Administrative Law Judges to render an average of 500 to 700 ‘legally
sufficient’ decisions each year.”). Administrative Law Judges are the officers
charged with disability hearing adjudication. See infra Section I.B.
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years before sitting for a hearing.4 As one ALJ bluntly
remarked, “We have decided it’s better for people to die than
to adequately fund this program.”5
This problem is partly attributable to the role of the
federal courts in SSA disability determinations.6 Appeals of
disability decisions weigh heavily on a district judge’s docket.
In 2016, for instance, these cases dwarfed the number of
appeals of other administrative agency decisions and
constituted seven percent of all district court filings
nationwide.7 Furthermore, the judges who hear these cases
sometimes feel ill-equipped to address the relevant issues in
disability cases.8 Although district court judges are
experienced in trial work, disability cases require them to
work in an appellate capacity.9 The disconnect between the
trial judge’s skill set and the nature of the work leads to
frustration and despair.10 Relatedly, SSA has suggested
judicial misapplication of the standard of review causes high
rates of remands to the Agency,11 which in turn creates more
work for the already burnt-out ALJs.

4. Gelbach & Marcus, supra note 3; see also Lizzie O’Leary, Peter BalononRosen, & Sean McHenry, Wait Times for Social Security Benefit Appeals Leave
People in Limbo, MARKETPLACE (Oct. 20, 2017, 4:38 PM), https://www.
marketplace.org/2017/10/20/world/wait-times-social-security-disability-benefithearings-leave-people-limbo.
5. McCoy, supra note 1.
6. Final Agency determinations regarding disability are reviewable by
federal district courts. See infra Part I.
7. JONAH GELBACH & DAVID MARCUS, ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., A
STUDY OF SOCIAL SECURITY LITIGATION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 4, 9–10 (2016).
8. See id. at 10 n.21.
9. Id. at 10.
10. Id. One federal judge described Social Security cases as “the bane of
[district court judges’] existence” and another remarked that disability appeals
are “horribly ill fit for the skill set of Article III judges and clerks.” Id. at 10 n.21.
11. See Revisions to Rules Regarding the Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 81
Fed. Reg. 62,560, 62,572 (proposed Sept. 9, 2016) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. pts.
404, 416) (“[T]hese courts, in reviewing final agency decisions, are reweighing
evidence instead of applying the substantial evidence standard of review . . . .”).
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In 2017, SSA promulgated sweeping regulatory reform
in part to relieve the burden of remands from federal courts.
Most notably for this Comment, the Agency repealed the
decades-old “treating physician rule.” This rule, which is
used to evaluate medical opinion evidence, caused frequent
remands. Both Agency adjudicators and federal judges alike
struggled to apply the old-fashioned rule to the modern
landscape of healthcare delivery and physician-patient
relationships. By repealing the rule, remands may decrease,
and systemic tensions may decline.
The benefits of increased judicial and administrative
economy through repeal of the treating physician rule could
be significant. However, increasing efficiency may also cause
a decline in fairness to individual participants in the legal
system.12 The Social Security Act, which is the law that
established federal disability programs, is a remedial and
inclusive statute designed to provide relief from life’s
hardships.13 To maintain the spirit of the statute, fairness
must not be sacrificed at the altar of efficiency. While the
treating physician rule needed reform, it also provided for
fair consideration of the claimant’s medical evidence in
certain contexts. Thus, steps should be taken to mitigate the
potential negative consequences the repeal might bring for
claimants.
This Comment provides an in-depth examination of the
repeal of the treating physician rule in Social Security
Disability law. Part I explains the fundamental legal
principles of SSA disability determinations. Part II discusses
the historical development of the treating physician rule, the
12. See, e.g., Elijah Yip & Eric K. Yamamoto, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s
Jurisprudence of Process and Procedure, 20 U. HAW. L. REV. 647, 667 (1998)
(explaining that procedural values of efficiency and fairness often collide and
overlap).
13. See Marcus v. Califano, 615 F.2d 23, 29 (2d Cir. 1979) (“The Social
Security Act is a remedial statute which must be ‘liberally applied’; its intent is
inclusion rather than exclusion.”); Rodriguez v. Celebrezze, 349 F.2d 494, 496 (1st
Cir. 1965) (“[T]he Social Security Act is to be construed liberally to effectuate its
general purpose of easing the insecurity of life . . . .”).
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Agency justifications for repealing it, and the current state
of the law. Finally, Part III examines two circumstances
where the treating physician rule’s repeal may impact the
rights of claimants: cases where a claimant’s mental health
is at issue and the qualified right to subpoena physicians for
disability hearings. Part III also suggests regulatory changes
which seek to maintain the bulk of SSA’s policy overhaul
while addressing the potential adverse effects of repealing
the treating physician rule.
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THE BASICS OF SOCIAL SECURITY LAW AND PRACTICE

This Part will explain the fundamental concepts of Social
Security Disability law. First, I provide a brief historical
overview and substantive discussion of the Social Security
Act. The next section explains the adjudication process for
disability claims. Finally, I explore the meaning of “disabled”
under the Social Security Act and explain how adjudicators
apply that definition to make decisions on claims.
A. A Brief Overview of the Social Security Act and
Disability Benefits
The Social Security Act (“the Act”) was signed into law
on August 14, 1935, by President Franklin D. Roosevelt.14
The Act originally contained no provisions relating to
disability benefits.15 However, in 1956, the law was amended
to provide benefits to disabled workers.16 Upon authorizing
the amendments, President Dwight Eisenhower promised to
administer disability benefits “efficiently and effectively.”17
In 1972, the Act was amended again to include the
Supplemental Security Income program, which is still in
effect today.18
The modern Social Security Act provides disability
benefits through two programs administered by the Social
Security Administration: Social Security Disability
Insurance (“SSDI”) and Supplemental Security Income
(“SSI”). To qualify for SSDI, a person must demonstrate past
employment and payment into the Social Security program
through taxes.19 By contrast, SSI has no past employment or
14. OFFICE OF RET. & DISABILITY POLICY, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., ANNUAL
STATISTICAL REPORT ON THE SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY INSURANCE PROGRAM 1
(2017) [hereinafter DISABILITY REPORT].
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Nate Ghubril, Social Security Disability Reform: Steps Toward Economic
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tax payment requirement; the program is distributed to
those in financial need.20 Both programs require
beneficiaries to show they are disabled within the meaning
of the Social Security Act.21
The Social Security Administration is an independent
agency that administers disability benefits programs. The
Agency is the largest provider of social welfare in the United
States and accounts for twenty-two percent of the federal
government’s total costs.22 It is headed by the Commissioner
of Social Security (“the Commissioner”). This position
requires nomination by the President and confirmation by
the U.S. Senate.23 Appointees serve for a term of six years,24
meaning the office is somewhat isolated from partisan
politics. The current Commissioner, Andrew M. Saul, was
appointed by President Donald J. Trump and sworn in on
June 17, 2019.25
B. The Journey of a Claim from Online Application to
Federal Court
A claim for disability benefits begins with an online or
paper application.26 The claimant provides SSA with
information about her work history, medical conditions,
doctors, and other health care providers.27 After receiving the
Efficiency and Improved Claimant Care, 74 U. PITT. L. REV. 549, 554 (2013).
20. Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a) (2012).
21. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(a)(1)(E), 1382c(a)(3) (2012).
22. STEVEN T. MNUCHIN, U.S. DEP’T OF
GOVERNMENT 3 (2017).

THE

TREASURY, FINANCIAL REPORT

OF

THE UNITED STATES

23. 42 U.S.C. § 902(a)(1) (2012); see also U.S. CONST. art. II.
24. 42 U.S.C. § 902(a)(3).
25. Jim Borland, Social Security Welcomes its New Commissioner, SOC. SEC.
ADMIN. BLOG (June 17, 2019), https://blog.ssa.gov/social-security-welcomes-itsnew-commissioner/.
26. Emily C. Russell & Hon. Glynn F. Voisin, A Primer on Social Security
Disability Law, 62 LOY. L. REV. 829, 834 (2016).
27. See Disability Benefits, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., www.ssa.gov/benefits/disability/
(last visited Dec. 14, 2018).
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application, the Agency develops the claimant’s medical
history by requesting records from the claimant’s medical
sources.28 The Agency then makes an initial determination
whether the claimant is disabled.29 If the Agency finds the
claimant disabled, she is eligible for benefits.30 In 2016, only
35.4% of applicants prevailed at the first level of disability
adjudication.31
A claimant who receives an unfavorable initial
decision—a finding of “not disabled”—may file for
reconsideration within sixty days.32 If the claimant is
unsatisfied with the decision after reconsideration, she may
request a hearing with an ALJ.33 The ALJ reviews the claim
de novo to determine whether the claimant is disabled.34
Prior to the hearing date, the ALJ continues to collect the
claimant’s medical evidence and fully develops the facts of
the case.35 During the hearing, the ALJ elicits testimony
from the claimant and any lay or expert witnesses called to
28. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512(b), 416.912(b) (2016).
29. Russell & Voisin, supra note 26, at 834.
30. In addition to proving disability, claimants must also demonstrate either
the work requirements for SSDI or the needs-based qualifications for SSI. See
supra Section I.A. Generally, regulations pertaining to disability determination
for SSDI are codified at 20 C.F.R. Part 404, and for SSI at Part 416. However, the
adjudication process is similar for both programs. See Ghubril, supra note 19, at
554–55.
31. DISABILITY REPORT, supra note 14, at 159.
32. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.909(a)(1), 416.1409(a) (2016). Some commentators have
suggested eliminating reconsideration from the disability adjudication process.
See, e.g., FRANK S. BLOCH, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE SOCIAL
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION’S ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS PROCESS 363 (1989).
33. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.930, 416.1430 (2018).
34. Oren R. Griffin, Social Security Disability Law and the Obstacles Facing
Claimants with Mental Disabilities, 36 L. & PSYCHOL. REV. 147, 153 (2012).
35. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512(b), 416.912(b) (2018) (detailing SSA’s duty to
request medical evidence); Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 410 (1971) (“The
social security hearing examiner, furthermore, does not act as counsel. He acts
as an examiner charged with developing the facts.”); Snead v. Barnhart, 360 F.3d
834, 838 (8th Cir. 2004) (“Well-settled precedent confirms that the ALJ bears a
responsibility to develop the record fairly and fully, independent of the claimant’s
burden to press his case.”).
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provide information relevant to the case.36 Once the ALJ
makes a determination, she issues a written opinion
detailing the findings of fact and conclusions of law
underlying her decision.37 If the ALJ gives an unfavorable
decision, the claimant may request review by the SSA
Appeals Council.38 The decision of the Appeals Council is
binding.39 If a claimant receives an unfavorable decision
from the Appeals Council, she has exhausted all available
administrative remedies.40
If the claimant receives an unfavorable final
determination from the Appeals Council, she may file a civil
action against the Commissioner of Social Security in a
federal district court.41 Procedurally, the parties file crossmotions for judgment on the pleadings and the district court
judge disposes of the case by granting either the plaintiff’s
motion or the Commissioner’s motion.42 The Court has
authority to uphold, reverse, or remand the Commissioner’s
determination of disability.43 However, the Court is bound to
uphold the Commissioner’s findings of fact if they are
supported by “substantial evidence.”44 Decisions on claims by

36. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.929, 416.1429 (2018); Griffin, supra note 34, at 154.
37. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.917, 416.1417 (2018).
38. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.967, 416.1467 (2018).
39. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.981, 416.1481 (2018).
40. See id.; see also Charles H. Koch, Jr. & David A. Koplow, The Fourth Bite
at the Apple: A Study of the Operation and Utility of the Social Security
Administration’s Appeals Council, 17 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 199, 231 (1990).
41. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2012); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.981, 416.1481.
42. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(c); Igonia v. Califano, 568 F.2d 1383, 1389 (D.C. Cir.
1977) (explaining that the Social Security Act “directs the court to enter its
judgment upon the pleadings and the transcript of the record”). There is no
discovery in Social Security cases because the evidentiary record is developed at
the administrative level.
43. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2012).
44. Id. See also Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (defining the
substantial evidence standard as “more than a mere scintilla” and “such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.”); Jones v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 336 F.3d 469, 477 (6th Cir. 2003)
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district court judges may be appealed to the United States
Circuit Courts of Appeals and subsequently to the Supreme
Court of the United States.45
C. Determining Disability
The definition of “disabled” found in the Social Security
Act is complex and narrow. A person is disabled when he is
unable to engage in “substantial gainful activity”46 because
of a physical or mental impairment expected to last longer
than twelve months or result in death.47 The impairment
must be so severe that it precludes the person from doing any
past work, or any other kind of work the person could do
considering his work experience, education, and age.48 If a
person has multiple impairments, the combined impact of
those impairments on the person’s ability to work must be
considered throughout disability determination.49
The Act authorizes the Commissioner to promulgate
regulations to carry out disability programs.50 Thus, SSA
devised a regulatory scheme—known as the “five-step

(“[T]he Commissioner’s decision cannot be overturned if substantial evidence, or
even a preponderance of the evidence, supports the claimant’s position, so long
as substantial evidence also supports the conclusion reached by the ALJ.”);
Jesurum v. Sec’y of the U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 48 F.3d 114, 117
(3d Cir. 1995) (“[Substantial evidence] is less than a preponderance of the
evidence but more than a mere scintilla.”).
45. See, e.g., Biestek v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 880 F.3d 778 (6th Cir. 2017), cert.
granted, 138 S. Ct. 2677 (2018).
46. The phrase “substantial gainful activity” is defined in regulations.
Activity is “substantial” if it involves “doing significant physical or mental
activities” and “gainful” if it is done for pay or profit, whether or not a profit is
realized. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1572, 416.972. Even unlawful work—such as
prostitution—may qualify as substantial gainful activity. See Margaret A.
Baldwin, “A Million Dollars and an Apology”: Prostitution and Public Benefits
Claims, 10 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 189, 216–18 (1999).
47. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) (2012).
48. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A).
49. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(B).
50. 42 U.S.C. § 405(a)–(b).
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sequential evaluation process”—for disability adjudication51:
(1) If the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity, he is
not disabled.52
(2) If the claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful activity, the
agency determines whether the claimant has a severe mental or
physical impairment, or a combination of impairments that is
severe. If the claimant does not have a severe impairment (or a
severe combination), he is not disabled.53
(3) If the claimant has a severe impairment, SSA determines
whether one of the claimant’s impairments meets or equals a
“listing.”54 If an impairment meets this level of severity, the
claimant is disabled; if an impairment does not meet this level, SSA
proceeds to Step Four.55
(4) SSA considers the claimant’s ability to perform past work. If the
claimant can perform any of his past work, he is not disabled; if he
cannot perform any of his past work, SSA moves to Step Five. 56
(5) If a claimant cannot perform his past work, SSA considers
whether there are any jobs the claimant could perform considering
his vocational background and medical impairments. If the
claimant can perform other work, he is not disabled; if he cannot
perform other work, he is disabled.57

Before proceeding to step four, SSA assesses the
claimant’s “residual functional capacity” (“RFC”). RFC is
“the most you can still do despite your limitations.”58
51. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)–(v), 416.920(a)(4)(i)–(v) (2018); see also
Russell & Voisin, supra note 26, at 836 (providing a graphic representation of the
five-step sequential process).
52. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i), 416.920(a)(4)(i).
53. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii).
54. “Listings” refer to a listing of impairments contained in the first appendix
to 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P. If a claimant can demonstrate he meets the
requirements found in a listing, he is disabled.
55. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii).
56. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv).
57. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v).
58. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(1), 416.945(a)(1) (2018); see also Jon C. Dubin,
Overcoming Gridlock: Campbell After a Quarter-Century and Bureaucratically
Rational Gap-Filling in Mass Justice Adjudication in the Social Security
Administration’s Disability Programs, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 937, 974 (2010).
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Specifically, SSA evaluates the claimant’s ability to meet the
physical, mental, and sensory demands of work. 59 SSA
considers all the relevant medical evidence in the claimant’s
record to determine the extent of the claimant’s physical,60
mental,61 and other abilities.62 RFC is applied at step four to
determine if the claimant can do any past work, and at step
five to determine if there are any other jobs in the national
economy the claimant could do.63
The claimant carries the burden of proof through the
first four steps, either to refute a finding of “not disabled” or
to demonstrate a finding of “disabled.”64 At step five, the
burden shifts to SSA.65 If the claim proceeds to step five, then
the Agency must prove what other work the claimant could
perform.66 During a hearing, an ALJ elicits testimony from a
Vocational Expert (“VE”), who opines about specific jobs the
claimant could or could not perform considering the
claimant’s RFC.67 For cases that reach the hearing stage, the
VE testimony is central to SSA’s determination at step five.68
Medical evidence is essential to the five-step process and
disability determinations in general. SSA relies on several
types of evidence to determine whether or not an individual
is disabled: (1) objective medical evidence, (2) medical
59. §§ 404.1545(a)(4), 416.945(a)(4).
60. §§ 404.1545(b), 416.945(b) (including, for example, the ability to sit, stand,
walk, lift, carry, push, and pull).
61. §§ 404.1545(c), 416.945(c) (including the ability to understand, remember,
carry out instructions, and deal with workplace stress).
62. §§ 404.1545(d), 416.945(d) (including abilities limited by impairments of
vision and hearing).
63. §§ 404.1545(a)(5), 416.945(a)(5).
64. Shaibi v. Berryhill, 883 F.3d 1102, 1106 (9th Cir. 2017).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See Nathaniel O. Hubley, The Untouchables: Why a Vocational Expert’s
Testimony in Social Security Hearings Cannot Be Touched, 43 VAL. U. L. REV.
353, 368–70 (2008).
68. Id. at 377–78.
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opinions, (3) other medical evidence, (4) evidence from nonmedical sources, and (5) prior administrative medical
findings.69 “Objective medical evidence” includes medical
signs70 and laboratory findings.71 A “medical opinion” is a
statement from a medical source explaining what a disability
claimant can still do despite his physical, mental, or sensory
impairments.72 “Other medical evidence” includes any
evidence from a medical source other than objective medical
evidence or medical opinions.73 The fourth category,
“evidence from nonmedical sources,” introduces the
distinction between medical and nonmedical sources.
Medical sources include physicians, psychologists, speechlanguage pathologists, registered nurses, and physician
assistants.74 Nonmedical sources include the claimant’s own
testimony, school teachers, public and private social welfare
personnel, and the claimant’s friends and family.75
The claimant bears the ultimate responsibility for
submitting medical evidence in support of her claim.76
However, if the Agency cannot decide a claim based on the
evidence submitted, it will purchase a consultative
examination (“CE”) to develop the record.77 The CE is a
69. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1513, 416.913 (2018).
70. A medical “sign” is “one or more anatomical, physiological, or
psychological abnormalities that can be observed, apart from your statements
(symptoms).” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502(g). Signs must be observable through
“medically acceptable clinical diagnostic techniques.” Id.
71. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1513, 416.913.
72. Id.
73. Id. This category includes judgments about the nature and severity of a
claimant’s conditions, medical history, diagnoses, and prognoses.
74. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1502(a), 416.902(a) (2018).
75. §§ 404.1502(e), 416.902(j).
76. §§ 404.1512, 416.912 (“In general, you have to prove to us that you are
blind or disabled.”).
77. §§ 404.1517, 416.917; Frank S. Bloch, Jeffrey S. Lubbers & Paul R.
Verkuil, Developing a Full and Fair Evidentiary Record in a Nonadversary
Setting: Two Proposals for Improving Social Security Disability Adjudications,
25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 30–31 (2003).
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physical or mental examination by a health care provider
purchased by the Agency to provide additional information
to aid in disability determination. Specifically, the CE
physician examines the claimant and produces a report.78
The report should provide a summary of the claimant’s
medical history, objective medical findings, and an opinion
statement about the activities the claimant can still do
despite her impairments.79 The regulations suggest that the
Agency should ask a claimant’s own physician or other
treating source to perform the CE,80 but in practice the
examiner is rarely the claimant’s doctor.81

78. DAVID WITTENBURG ET AL., AN ASSESSMENT OF CONSULTATIVE EXAMINATION
(CE) PROCESSES, CONTENT, AND QUALITY: FINDINGS FROM THE CE REVIEW DATA
10–12 (2012).
79. Id.
80. §§ 404.1519h, 416.919h. But see §§ 404.1519i, 416.919i (explaining
situations where a claimant’s medical source will not be used).
81. See WITTENBURG, supra note 78, at 26–27 (in a study on consultative
examinations, only five percent were performed by a treating source).
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II. THE TREATING PHYSICIAN RULE & ARTICULATION
REQUIREMENTS: APPLICATION, HISTORY, & REPEAL
Part I of this Comment explored the basic legal
principles behind Social Security Disability law. This Part
will provide an in-depth examination of the treating
physician rule, from its inception in the mid-twentieth
century to its repeal in 2017. First, I will discuss the origin
of the rule and its development over time. Next, I will discuss
the way federal judges and ALJs applied the rule before
2017. This Part ends with a discussion of the rule’s repeal
and what, if anything, remains of the rule post-2017.
Broadly stated, the treating physician rule (or “treating
source rule”) is an evidentiary rule that regulates the
influence of medical opinion evidence on disability
determinations. When the administrative record contains
one or more medical opinions, adjudicators must decide how
much “weight,” or persuasive value, each opinion has in
relation to the other opinions and other types of evidence in
the record. For many decades, the treating physician rule
guided adjudicators in the task of weighing opinion evidence.
While slight variations developed over time, the rule’s core
idea remained: the opinion of a claimant’s treating source
deserves great weight because of her unique perspective on
the claimant’s conditions.82 A treating source is a physician
or other medical source with an “ongoing treatment
relationship” with the claimant.83 The rule applies only to a

82. See, e.g., 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2), 416.927(c)(2) (2018); Rosa v.
Callahan, 168 F.3d 72, 78–79 (2d Cir. 1999) (“The opinion of a treating physician
is given controlling weight if it is well supported by medical findings and not
inconsistent with other substantial evidence.”); Walters v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
127 F.3d 525, 529–30 (6th Cir. 1997) (“In general, the opinions of treating
physicians are accorded greater weight than those of physicians who examine
claimants only once.”); Heslep v. Celebrezze, 356 F.2d 891, 894 (4th Cir. 1966)
(reversing the Commissioner’s decision partly because he “unwarrantedly
disregarded the testimony of Dr. Smith, the treating physician.”).
83. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(a)(2) (2018) (“Generally, we will consider that you
have an ongoing treatment relationship with an acceptable medical source when
the medical evidence establishes that you see, or have seen, the source with a
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physician’s findings concerning the nature and severity of a
claimant’s conditions; it does not apply to issues reserved for
the Commissioner such as whether the claimant is disabled
as a matter of law.84 This Part explores three distinct periods
of treating physician doctrine: early common-law
applications, the 1991–2016 regulatory regime, and the 2017
repeal.
A. Common-Law Origins and Inception of the Treating
Physician Rule
Understanding the development of the treating
physician rule over time is important for understanding the
rule’s use as a tool of federal courts to ensure fair
consideration of evidence in disability cases. Indeed, the rule
originated as a judicial construct.85 As Justice Ginsburg once
observed, it was “originally developed by Courts of Appeals
as a means to control disability determinations by
administrative law judges under the Social Security Act.” 86
frequency consistent with accepted medical practice for the type of treatment
and/or evaluation required for your medical condition(s).”). Courts have typically
decided on a case-by-case basis whether or not a treating physician relationship
exists. See, e.g., Jasen v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 16-CV-6153P, 2017 WL 3722454
at *10 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2017) (“[I]t is unclear whether [the physician] qualifies
as a treating physician because the record suggests that she met with [the
claimant] on only two occasions before rendering her opinion . . . .”); Patterson v.
Astrue, No. 5:11-CV-1143 (MAD/DEP), 2013 WL 638617 at *8 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 24,
2013) (“[T]hree examinations by [a physician] over the course of four months . . .
does not constitute the type of ‘ongoing relationship’ that is required for finding
that s/he is plaintiff’s treating physician . . . .”).
84. West v. Barnhart, 254 F. Supp. 2d 1216, 1222 (D. Kan. 2003) (“A treating
physician’s opinion of an issue reserved to the Commissioner, such as disability,
is not controlling because determining the ultimate issue is the responsibility of
the Commissioner.”).
85. See Rachel Schneider, A Role for the Courts: Treating Physician Evidence
in Social Security Disability Determinations, 3 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 391,
396 (1996).
86. Black & Decker Disability Plan v. Nord, 538 U.S. 822, 829 (2003). This
case was not a Social Security case; rather, the Court answered the question of
whether the treating physician rule used in SSA disability determinations also
applies to disability determinations under employee benefits plans covered by
ERISA.
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Each Circuit Court articulated the rule somewhat
differently. For example, the Tenth Circuit required the
Commissioner to give “substantial weight” to a treating
physician’s testimony, unless she could show “good cause” for
disregarding the testimony.87 The Second Circuit required
particularly strict deference to the treating physician: a
treating physician’s opinion was binding on the fact-finder
unless substantial evidence contradicted that opinion.88 By
contrast, the First Circuit used a much less deferential
standard, holding that a treating physician’s opinion is “not
necessarily entitled” to more weight than a physician who
has only examined a claimant once.89
In the late 1980s, the Second Circuit’s highly deferential
formulation of the treating physician rule became the subject
of three class action suits: Schisler I, II, and III.90 As
explained below, the plaintiffs in these suits sought to force
SSA to comply with the Second Circuit’s formulation of the
rule. Ultimately, the decisions in Schisler I and II prompted
the Agency to codify the treating physician rule in federal
regulations, which were upheld by the Second Circuit in
Schisler III.
In Schisler I, the plaintiff class of disability claimants
challenged termination decisions by SSA,91 arguing that
benefits were wrongfully terminated pursuant to an
arbitrarily imposed evidentiary standard.92 After a

87. Id.; Frey v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 508, 513 (10th Cir. 1987).
88. Schisler v. Heckler, 787 F.2d 76, 81 (2d Cir. 1986).
89. Sitar v. Schweiker, 671 F.2d 19, 22 (1st Cir. 1982) (citing Perez v.
Secretary of HEW, 622 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1980)).
90. Schisler v. Heckler, 787 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1986) (“Schisler I”); Schisler v.
Bowen, 851 F.2d 43 (2d Cir. 1988) (“Schisler II”); Schisler v. Sullivan, 3 F.3d 563
(2d Cir. 1993) (“Schisler III”); see also Schneider, supra note 85, at 398–400.
91. Schisler I, 787 F.2d at 78.
92. Id. As explained by the Schisler I court, SSA changed the standard for
benefits termination in 1976 without any relevant statutory change. Before 1976,
SSA used a “medical improvement” standard for termination which required the
Agency to demonstrate a claimant’s medical condition had improved after he
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complicated series of procedural steps,93 the plaintiffs moved
for an injunction that would require SSA to comply with the
Second Circuit’s treating physician rule.94 The motion was
denied, and plaintiffs appealed to the Second Circuit.95 On
appeal, the Court reversed the district judge’s order denying
the plaintiffs’ motion. In its opinion, the Court noted that
SSA had consistently failed to apply the treating physician
rule in practice, as evidenced by the high volume of ALJ
decisions vacated by federal courts on the basis of the rule.96
Additionally, the Court suggested that if SSA wished not to
abide by the Second Circuit’s rule, it should have sought
review in the Supreme Court.97 To ensure compliance with
the rule, the Court remanded the case to the district court
and ordered SSA to produce “relevant publications”
instructing disability adjudicators to apply the Second
Circuit’s formulation of the rule.98
On remand, the Secretary of Health and Human Services
proposed a draft Social Security Ruling (“SSR”)99 attempting
began receiving benefits. This standard was changed in 1976 to a “current
disability” standard, which allowed for termination of benefits if the claimant
could not produce substantial evidence of continuing disability regardless of
whether there was medical improvement. In 1984, Congress passed the Social
Security Disability Benefits Reform Act, which reinstated the medical
improvement standard. See Eileen P. Sweeney, The New “Medical Improvement”
Standard In Social Security and SSI Disability Cases, 14 SOC. SEC. REP. SERV.
965, 967 (1986).
93. The district court judge found in favor of the plaintiffs, ordering that class
members’ termination decisions be “expeditiously remanded” for further
administrative proceedings. Subsequently, both the plaintiffs and the Agency
moved to amend the judgment. The Agency sought to reduce the size of the
plaintiff class, while plaintiffs sought an injunction requiring SSA to follow the
Second Circuit formulation of the treating physician rule. Schisler I, 787 F.2d at
78.
94. Schisler I, 787 F.2d at 78.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 82 (“[C]ases reversing SSA in district courts and in this court on
[the treating physician rule] are ‘almost legion.’”).
97. Id. at 83.
98. Id. at 84.
99. Social Security Rulings are publications made under the Commissioner’s
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to enshrine the Second Circuit’s treating physician rule as
official administrative policy.100 However, the district court
found the draft SSR’s articulation of the rule deviated
considerably from Second Circuit caselaw.101 The district
court subsequently edited the draft SSR to more accurately
reflect Second Circuit precedent and to follow the Court’s
order in Schisler I.102 SSA appealed, claiming the district
court exceeded its authority by rewriting the draft SSR. 103
The decision on that appeal became known as Schisler II.
In Schisler II, the Second Circuit largely upheld the
district court’s revisions and added a few revisions of its own.
It reasoned that if SSA wanted to substantively elaborate on
the treating physician rule, it would need to resort to
“customary administrative processes.”104 The final version of
the SSR approved by the Second Circuit purported to contain
“nothing that is not clearly authorized by [Second Circuit]
caselaw.”105
In 1991, SSA published new regulations creating a
uniform treating physician rule through formal notice and
comment rulemaking.106 Plaintiffs challenged these
regulations in Schisler III, claiming the new regulations—
which deviated from the Second Circuit’s judge-made
authority that reflect the administration’s interpretations of the law. These
rulings do not have the effects or force of law, but are binding upon SSA
employees and adjudicators. Social Security and Acquiescence Rulings, SOC. SEC.
ADMIN., https://www.ssa.gov/OP_Home/rulings/rulings-pref.html (last visited
Apr. 18, 2020).
100. Schisler II, 851 F.2d 43, 44 (2d Cir. 1988).
101. Id. For example, the draft SSR made the treating physician rule one of
several factors an adjudicator considered rather than making the treating
physician’s opinion binding on the adjudicator. Id.
102. Id. at 45.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 46.
106. Standards for Consultative Examinations and Existing Medical Evidence,
56 Fed. Reg. 36,932 (Aug. 1, 1991); Schneider, supra note 85, at 400. This
regulatory scheme is discussed further in Section II.B infra.
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treating physician rule—violated the previous holdings in
Schisler I and II.107 In this final iteration of the Schisler saga,
the court sided with SSA. It held that SSA had statutory
authority to create a regulatory scheme regarding the weight
to be afforded to a treating physician’s opinion.108 Despite
various departures from Second Circuit caselaw, the new
rules were neither arbitrary nor capricious and thus valid.109
Accordingly, the court reversed the lower court’s decision
that the new regulations were not binding on the courts.110
Under the decision in Schisler III, Agency regulations
prevailed as the highest authority on deference to the
treating physician.111
As stated in the beginning of this Section, the history of
the rule and the challenges it faced show how federal courts
sought to use the rule to constrain SSA and promote fair
consideration of a claimant’s medical evidence. Under the
Social Security Act, courts may only overturn an
administrative decision if the decision is not supported by
substantial evidence.112 Since there is no explicit statutory
authority for the treating physician rule, its genesis and
subsequent affirmations in the Schisler cases are properly
viewed as judicial elaboration of the substantial evidence
standard. Essentially, an administrative decision which does
not consider the opinion of a treating physician is not a
decision supported by substantial evidence.113 This

107. Schisler III, 3 F.3d 563, 567 (2d Cir. 1993).
108. Id. at 564.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 565.
111. See Schaal v. Apfel, 134 F.3d 496, 503 (2d Cir. 1998) (“In Schisler III, we
upheld the new regulations and clarified that they superseded the more
deferential treating physician rule previously in force in this Circuit.”).
112. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2012); Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971).
113. See Broadbent v. Harris, 698 F.2d 407, 412 (10th Cir. 1983) (“In
determining the question of substantiality of evidence, the reports of physicians
who have treated a patient over a period of time or who are consulted for purposes
of treatment are given greater weight than are reports of physicians employed
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construction of the law ensured that administrative
decisions were guided by physicians with a complete and
intimate understanding of a claimant’s conditions.
B. Applying the Treating Physician Rule: Weighing Opinion
Evidence for Claims Filed Before March 27, 2017
The regulatory regime established post-Schisler is still
applied by Agency adjudicators and federal courts for all
claims filed before March 27, 2017.114 Under the regulations,
SSA ordinarily defers to the opinions of a claimant’s treating
source.115 The rules explain that treating sources are “most
able to provide a detailed, longitudinal picture” of a
claimant’s medical impairments and “may bring a unique
perspective to the medical evidence that cannot be obtained
from the objective medical findings alone . . . .”116 If a treating
source’s opinion is supported by other substantial evidence
in a claimant’s record, SSA gives the opinion “controlling
weight.”117 If the Agency does not give a treating source’s
and paid by the government . . . .”) (emphasis added); Richard E. Levy & Robert
L. Glicksman, Agency-Specific Precedents, 89 TEX. L. REV. 499, 546–47 (2011). In
the article by Professors Levy and Glicksman, two views are advanced regarding
the relationship between the treating physician rule and the substantial evidence
standard. On one hand, it may be that where an ALJ does not explain his
rejection of a treating physician in favor of a consulting physician, there is not
enough evidence such that a “reasonable mind” could come to the same conclusion
as the ALJ, and therefore the decision is not supported by substantial evidence.
On the other hand, it may be that the treating physician rule arose out of “judicial
mistrust” of the SSA and is not really an application of the substantial evidence
standard.
114. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527, 416.927 (2018); see also Michael N. Rhinehart,
Treating Physician Rule Eliminated in Social Security Regulations, FED. LAW.,
Oct.–Nov. 2017, at 5, 5 (“The regulations in effect before March 27, 2017,
generally provide for the giving of greater weight to the opinion of a treating
physician over the opinion of a one-time examining physician.”).
115. §§ 404.1527(c)(2), 416.927(c)(2).
116. Id.
117. Id.; see also Martinez v. Chater, 64 F.3d 172, 176 (5th Cir. 1995) (treating
physician’s opinion not entitled to controlling weight where the physician did not
provide a medical explanation for his opinion and was contradicted by two other
opinions); Franklin v. Shalala, 876 F. Supp. 168, 173 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (treating
source not given controlling weight where the source opined on issues reserved
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opinion controlling weight, it must apply a number of factors
to determine how much weight to assign to that opinion.118
Additionally, the Agency must provide in writing “good
reasons” for the weight given to a claimant’s treating
source.119
While treating sources are given great weight,
consulting sources (e.g., the physician who performs a
claimant’s CE) are given limited weight.120 A consulting
source is a medical source who has only examined the
claimant once or twice during a limited time period. If
opinions from a treating source and a consulting source are
conflicting, the Agency should generally favor the treating
source.121 However, the opinion of a consulting source
properly overrides that of a treating physician if it is
supported by substantial evidence and the treating source’s
opinion is not.122
The findings of nonexamining state agency consultants
(or “reporting physicians”) are also considered expert opinion
evidence.123 These consultants review the claimant’s medical
for the commissioner); Revisions to Rules Regarding the Evaluation of Medical
Evidence, 81 Fed. Reg. 62,560, 62,572 (proposed Sept. 9, 2016) (to be codified at
20 C.F.R. pts. 404, 416) (“To give a treating source’s opinion controlling weight
means to adopt it.”).
118. §§ 404.1527(c)(2), 416.927(c)(2) (“When we do not give the treating
source’s medical opinion controlling weight, we apply the factors listed in
paragraphs (c)(2)(i) and (c)(2)(ii) of this section, as well as the factors in
paragraphs (c)(3) through (c)(6) of this section in determining the weight to give
the medical opinion.”).
119. Id. (“We will always give good reasons in our notice of determination or
decision for the weight we give your treating source’s medical opinion.”); see also
Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1012 (9th Cir. 2014) (“If a treating or examining
doctor’s opinion is contradicted by another doctor’s opinion, an ALJ may only
reject it by providing specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by
substantial evidence.”).
120. Cruz v. Sullivan, 912 F.2d 8, 13 (2d Cir. 1990).
121. See Camille v. Colvin, 104 F. Supp. 3d 329, 343 (W.D.N.Y. 2015).
122. E.g., Jones v. Shalala, 900 F. Supp. 663, 669 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (citing Diaz
v. Shalala, 59 F.3d 307, 313 n.5 (2d Cir. 1995)).
123. Frye ex rel. A.O. v. Astrue, 485 F. App’x 484, 487 (summary order) (2d Cir.
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records and produce a report for the Agency, but do not
actually examine the claimant.124 The report is produced for
the first level of adjudication, and must subsequently be
evaluated by an ALJ at the hearing level.125 The opinions of
state agency consultants are typically given limited
weight.126 However, these opinions may be given more
weight if they are corroborated by other evidence in the
record.127 If the Agency gives great weight to a nonexamining
source opinion, there must be sufficient reasons for doing so.
For example, the source must provide a sufficient
explanation for their opinion, or have a specialization
relevant to the claimant’s conditions.128
In sum, the pre-2017 rules for weighing medical opinion
evidence focused around the relationship between the
medical source and the claimant. SSA gave treating sources
the greatest weight, while giving consulting sources and
nonexamining sources the least weight. Generally, as the
relationship between the claimant and the source became
more attenuated, adjudicators applied greater scrutiny of the
opinion when weighing it.129 The following section explains

2012) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(e)(2)(i)) (“The report of a State agency medical
consultant constitutes expert opinion evidence which can be given weight if
supported by medical evidence in the record.”).
124. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1513a, 416.913a (2018).
125. Id.
126. See Gayheart v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 710 F.3d 365, 376 (6th Cir. 2013);
Wildman v. Astrue, 596 F.3d 959, 967 (8th Cir. 2010); Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d
821, 831 (9th Cir. 1995).
127. See, e.g., Camille v. Colvin, 104 F. Supp. 3d 329, 343 (W.D.N.Y. 2015)
(holding that a state agency consultant’s opinion was appropriately afforded
greater weight than the treating physician where it was more consistent with the
record).
128. See Social Security Ruling 96-6p, 61 Fed. Reg. 34,466, 34,467 (July 2,
1996) (stating that nonexamining source opinions should be weighted based on
“medical evidence, qualifications, and explanations for the opinions”).
129. Gayheart, 710 F.3d at 375 (“[T]he regulations provide progressively more
rigorous tests for weighing opinions as the ties between the source of the opinion
and the individual become weaker.” (quoting Soc. Sec. Rul. 96-6p, 61 Fed. Reg. at
34,467)).
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the reasons why this system was ultimately disposed of for
all claims filed after March 27, 2017.
C. Repeal of the Treating Physician Rule and Changes to
the Policy for Weighing Medical Opinions
On September 9, 2016, SSA published a notice of
proposed rulemaking130 announcing major forthcoming
revisions to medical evidence rules.131 One such revision,
found under the heading “Consideration and Articulation of
Medical Opinions and Prior Administrative Medical
Findings,” suggested repealing the 1991 treating physician
regulatory regime.132 The Agency laid out several
“adjudicative issues” that arose from the treating physician
rule and the general policy for weighing medical opinion
evidence. In total, five reasons were given for repealing the
rule.133
First, the Agency pointed to the number of findings
required by Agency adjudicators.134 While not expressly
stated, this justification implied the rule imposed too heavy
a burden on adjudicators to sustain, as the policy required
adjudicators “to make a large number of findings that
need[ed] to be included in their determinations and
decisions.”135 Some files contained upwards of ten medical
opinions, and the regulations required adjudicators to
articulate reasons for assigning a particular weight to each

130. When SSA promulgates new regulations, it must follow the
Administrative Procedure Act. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012) (procedure for agency
rulemaking); Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 232–33 (1974) (explaining the purpose
of providing public notice of proposed administrative rules).
131. Revisions to Rules Regarding the Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 81 Fed.
Reg. 62,560, 62,560 (proposed Sept. 9, 2016) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. pts. 404,
416).
132. Id. at 62,570.
133. Id. at 62,572–74.
134. Id. at 62,572.
135. Id.
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opinion.136 The result was a high rate of remand from federal
district courts on the grounds that ALJs failed to assign
proper weight to one of the many opinions in the record.137
This finding is well supported by data from SSA, which
shows that 28.5% of federal court remands in 2018 were
related to an ALJ’s misapplication of the treating physician
rule.138
The second reason for repeal, labeled “Federal Court
Perspectives,” suggested that the rule influenced federal
courts to misapply the “substantial evidence” standard of
review.139 Rather than merely deciding whether the
Commissioner’s decision was supported by substantial
evidence, reviewing courts improperly focused on whether
the ALJ adequately articulated his reasons for rejecting a
treating source opinion.140 By challenging the reasons given
by ALJs for rejecting a treating source opinion, courts
effectively reweighed the evidence instead of applying the
deferential substantial evidence standard.141 SSA further
noted that some courts recognized problems with the rule,
136. Id.; see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c), 416.927(c) (2018) (stating that SSA
gives “good reasons” for assigning a particular weight to the medical opinions).
137. Revisions to Rules Regarding the Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 81 Fed.
Reg. at 62,572.
138. See SOC. SEC. ADMIN., TOP 10 REMAND REASONS CITED BY THE COURT ON
REMANDS TO SSA, https://www.ssa.gov/appeals/DataSets/AC08_Top_10_CR
.html. In FY 2018, the top reason for remand was “Treating Source—Opinion
Rejected Without Adequate Articulation,” representing 15.4% of all remands.
Also related to the treating physician rule were “Consultative
Examiner—Inadequate Support/Rationale for Weight Given Opinion” (7.0%),
“Non-Examining Source—Inadequate Support/Rationale for Weight Given
Opinion” (3.3%), and “Non-Examining Source—Opinion Accepted Without
Adequate Articulation” (2.8%).
139. Revisions to Rules Regarding the Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 81 Fed.
Reg. at 62,572.
140. Id.; see also ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., SSA DISABILITY BENEFITS
PROGRAMS: ASSESSING THE EFFICACY OF THE TREATING PHYSICIAN RULE 16 (2013).
141. Revisions to Rules Regarding the Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 81 Fed.
Reg. at 62,572. But see Levy & Glicksman, supra note 113, at 546–47 (presenting
the view that the treating physician rule may actually be an application of the
substantial evidence standard).
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such as the treating physician’s bias towards the claimant.142
While the Supreme Court never directly weighed in on the
issue, the Court cautioned in Black & Decker Disability Plan
v. Nord that a treating physician’s bias towards her patient
may unduly influence a finding of disabled.143
Third, the Agency cited the Ninth Circuit’s “Credit-asTrue” rule as an example of an adjudicative issue related to
the treating physician rule.144 The Credit-as-True rule
provided a three-part test that, if satisfied, triggered
immediate judgment for the claimant on the issue of
disability rather than a remand to the Agency for further
administrative proceedings.145 Combined with the treating
physician rule, an ALJ’s failure to provide sufficient
explanation for rejecting a treating source opinion could be
grounds for this extraordinary remedy.146 The Agency stated
that this rule denied it the opportunity to re-evaluate the
evidentiary record and caused judicial encroachment on
administrative power.147 While this rule was not applied
outside the Ninth Circuit, the Agency’s concern was
reasonable considering about twenty percent of the United
States population falls within the Ninth’s jurisdiction.148
142. Revisions to Rules Regarding the Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 81 Fed.
Reg. at 62,572–73; see Hofslien v. Barnhart, 439 F.3d 375, 377 (7th Cir. 2006)
(“[T]he fact that the claimant is the treating physician’s patient also detracts
from the weight of that physician’s testimony, since, as is well known, many
physicians . . . will often bend over backwards to assist a patient in obtaining
benefits.”).
143. Revisions to Rules Regarding the Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 81 Fed.
Reg. at 62,572–73; 538 U.S. 822, 832 (2003).
144. Revisions to Rules Regarding the Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 81 Fed.
Reg. at 62,573.
145. See Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1019, 1021–22 (9th Cir. 2014). To
grant this remedy, the Court remands to the Agency for the “calculation and
award of benefits” rather than for re-examining the issue of disability. Id. at 1023.
146. Revisions to Rules Regarding the Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 81 Fed.
Reg. at 62,573 (citing Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1292 (9th Cir. 1996)).
147. See id. (stating that the credit-as-true rule “effectively supplant[s] the
judgment of our decision makers”).
148. Dylan Matthews, How the 9th Circuit Became Conservatives’ Least
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The fourth reason for repealing the treating physician
rule was “Difficulty Determining Treating Source Status
Due to the Changing Nature of the Primary Healthcare
System.”149 SSA argued that when the rule was promulgated
in 1991, it was justified by the “unique perspective” a
treating physician provided that could not be found by
looking only at objective medical evidence.150 However,
modern health care delivery had changed drastically since
that time. Instead of developing a close relationship with one
primary doctor, claimants now treat with “coordinated and
managed care organizations.”151 These organizations are
highly specialized, meaning each individual organization is
unlikely to have a complete picture of a claimant’s medical
situation.152 Because of the changing landscape of health
care delivery, courts granted “treating source” status to
providers who do not fit the traditional meaning of the
term.153 In sum, the physician-patient relationship morphed
into something so different than what it used to be that the
modern “treating physician” does not deserve the kind of
deference afforded under the treating physician rule.154

Favorite Court, VOX (Jan. 10, 2018, 2:30 PM), https://www.vox.com/policy-andpolitics/2018/1/10/16873718/ninth-circuit-court-appeals-liberal-conservativetrump-tweet (“The Ninth [Circuit] covers a population of 64.3 million people . . .
or nearly 20 percent of the US.”).
149. Revisions to Rules Regarding the Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 81 Fed.
Reg. at 62,573.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. E.g., id. (listing “physicians with relatively sporadic treatment
relationships to claimants,” “all members of a healthcare team,” and “a physician
who coordinated care among medical sources but who did not personally examine
the claimant” as examples of nontraditional treating sources identified by courts);
see also Johnson v. Astrue, 597 F.3d 409, 411 (1st Cir. 2009); Shontos v. Barnhart,
328 F.3d 418, 426 (8th Cir. 2003).
154. See Revisions to Rules Regarding the Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 81
Fed. Reg. at 62,573 (“This ‘devaluation’ of the physician-patient relationship calls
into further question whether any deference—let alone ‘controlling weight’—
should be afforded to the opinions of this type of medical practitioner.”).
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Finally, SSA cited scholarly criticism of the treating
physician rule as a reason for repeal.155 The scholarly
arguments cited mostly speak to the Agency’s second
proposition, “Federal Court Perspectives,” which stated that
the rule influences courts to improperly apply the
substantial evidence standard.156 Thus, this reason is best
understood as additional support for the Agency’s second
argument instead of an independent justification.
All the issues identified by SSA circle back to a central
theme: tension between the federal court’s application of the
treating physician rule and the Agency’s interest in
independent and efficient administration of its programs.
Essentially, the treating physician rule permitted a great
degree of judicial scrutiny of Agency decisions.157
Consequently, courts issued a high number of remands,
which bogged down the administrative docket. The next
section discusses how SSA addressed these issues and
created the modern doctrine for weighing opinion evidence.
D. Weighing Opinion Evidence for Claims Filed After March
27, 2017: What Is Left of the Treating Physician Rule?
On January 18, 2017, SSA published final rules
regarding the weighing of opinion evidence for claims filed
after March 27, 2017.158 In these final rules, SSA responded
to public comments submitted after the September 9, 2016

155. Id.
156. Id.; see, e.g., Levy & Glicksman, supra note 113, at 547 (“It may be . . .
that the rule is the product of judicial mistrust of the SSA rather than a
generalizable application of the substantial evidence standard.”). But see
Revisions to Rules Regarding the Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 82 Fed. Reg.
5,844, 5,857 (Jan. 18, 2017) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. pts. 404, 416) (stating that
during the public comment period after the September 2016 notice of proposed
rulemaking, Professors Levy and Glicksman submitted comments complaining
that the Agency misrepresented their position on the treating physician rule).
157. Schneider, supra note 85, at 415–16.
158. Revisions to Rules Regarding the Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 82 Fed.
Reg. 5,844 (Jan. 18, 2017) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. pts. 404, 416); see also 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c, 416.920c (2018).
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notice of proposed rulemaking.159 Commenters were split
over the treating physician rule.160 Ultimately, the Agency
stuck to its decision to repeal the rule, relying largely on the
fourth justification from the notice of proposed
rulemaking.161
The regulatory regime for weighing medical opinion
evidence for claims filed after March 27, 2017 is codified at
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c & 416.920c. Under the new rules,
SSA adjudicators no longer give specific evidentiary weight
or deference to any medical opinion, including a treating
source opinion.162 Instead, the Agency applies a list of factors
and articulates how each medical opinion influenced its final
decision.163 The factors include supportability, consistency,
relationship to the claimant, specialization, and “other
factors.”164 While adjudicators use all of these factors in
evaluating a medical opinion, they need only articulate their
considerations of supportability and consistency.165 The
regulations specifically highlight supportability and
consistency as “the most important factors.”166
If a medical opinion fulfills the two main factors,
supportability and consistency, it is a persuasive opinion.167
159. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2012) (“After notice required by this section, the
agency shall give interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rule
making through submission of written data, views, or arguments . . . .”).
160. Revisions to Rules Regarding the Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 82 Fed.
Reg. at 5,852 (“Multiple commenters asked us to retain the current treating
source rule, while some commenters agreed with our proposal to eliminate it.”).
161. See id. at 5,853 (“Since we first adopted the current treating source rule
in 1991, the healthcare delivery system has changed in significant ways that
require us to revise our policies in order to reflect this reality.”).
162. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(a), 416.920c(a); cf §§ 404.1527, 416.927
(“Generally, we give more weight to medical opinions from your treating
sources . . . .”).
163. §§ 404.1520c(a), 416.920c(a).
164. §§ 404.1520c(c)(1)–(5), 416.920c(c)(1)–(5).
165. §§ 404.1520c(b)(2), 416.920c(b)(2).
166. Id.
167. §§ 404.1520c(c)(1)–(2), 416.920c(c)(1)–(2). Because claims filed after
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An opinion has supportability if the explanations and
objective medical evidence cited by the source are relevant to
support the opinion.168 The consistency element requires
comparison of a medical opinion with other evidence in the
record. The more consistent the opinion is with evidence from
other sources, the more persuasive the opinion is.169
The third factor, relationship with the claimant, is split
into five sub-factors.170 When analyzing the relationship
with the claimant, the adjudicator should consider (1) the
length of the treatment relationship, (2) the frequency of
examinations, (3) the purpose of the treatment relationship,
(4) the extent of the treatment relationship, and (5) whether
there was an examining relationship.171 Specialization, the
fourth factor, suggests that a medical opinion is more
persuasive if the source is a specialist in an area relevant to
the claimant’s conditions.172 Finally, the catch-all
provision—“other factors”—permits adjudicators to consider
“other factors that tend to support or contradict” a medical
opinion.173
Under this scheme laid out in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c &
416.920c, remnants of the treating physician rule lie in the
third factor, “relationship with the claimant.” For example,
the five sub-factors of factor three are traceable to the factors
applied under the 1991 rules for weight determination.174 As
March 27, 2017 have not yet reached federal district courts, there is no caselaw
to explain the application of these factors.
168. §§ 404.1520c(c)(1), 416.920c(c)(1).
169. §§ 404.1520c(c)(2), 416.920c(c)(2).
170. §§ 404.1520c(c)(3), 416.927c(c)(3).
171. Id.
172. §§ 404.1520c(c)(4), 416.927c(c)(4).
173. §§ 404.1520c(c)(5), 416.927c(c)(5) (including, but not limited to, “evidence
showing a medical source has familiarity with the other evidence in the claim or
an understanding of our disability program’s policies and evidentiary
requirements.”).
174. Compare, e.g., 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(3)(i)–(ii) (listing “length of
treatment relationship” and “frequency of examinations” in the 2017 regulations)
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stated above, however, factor three need not be articulated
in the Agency’s decision. In fact, it is questionable whether
an adjudicator is required to consider it at all.175 Thus, the
nature of the relationship between an opinion’s source and
the claimant is arguably an optional consideration, not
subject to judicial enforcement or review. For better or for
worse, the treating physician rule is no longer a viable tool
for claimants seeking relief from a negative Agency decision
in federal court.

with 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)(i) (listing “length of the treatment relationship
and frequency of examination” in the 1991 formulation).
175. See §§ 404.1520c(a), 416.1520c(a) (“[W]e will consider those medical
opinions . . . from that medical source together using the factors listed in
paragraphs (c)(1) through (c)(5) of this section, as appropriate.”) (emphasis
added). The “as appropriate” qualification, the repeated insistence that
supportability and consistency are the “most important” factors, and the lack of
articulation requirements for factors three through five suggest the decision to
consider factors other than supportability and consistency is a matter of Agency
discretion.
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III. POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF REPEALING THE TREATING
PHYSICIAN RULE AND PROPOSALS FOR MITIGATING ADVERSE
IMPACT ON CLAIMANTS
The treating physician rule was unquestionably due for
revision. Despite the 1991 switch from common law to
regulation, the substance of the rule—broad deference or
“controlling weight” to treating sources—has lingered since
the middle of the 20th century. SSA presented several
compelling reasons for repealing the rule in its September
2016 notice of proposed rulemaking. Perhaps most
persuasive is the assertion that the U.S. healthcare delivery
system and the physician-patient relationship have changed
so radically that there is little justification for keeping the
rule. Additionally, the Agency understandably wants to
decrease the number of federal court remands and keep
control over its unwieldy caseload.
However, it is important to keep in mind the core
promise of the Social Security Act: to provide relief to
individuals vulnerable to financial and social hardships.176
Despite being somewhat outdated, the treating physician
rule provided important protections for disability claimants.
As one commentator pointed out, subjective and contextual
considerations are inherent to disability determinations.177
While objective medical evidence is similarly important, an
individualized assessment by a physician intimately familiar
with the claimant’s conditions provides invaluable guidance
for subjective considerations. Since the treating physician is
capable of “producing the most individualized assessment,”
the treating physician rule ensured adjudicators favorably

176. See Brown & Bartlett v. United States, 330 F.2d 692, 696 (6th Cir. 1964)
(“Generally, in construing the Social Security Act, our court has favored that
interpretation which gives effect to the beneficent purposes of the Act.”); Arianna
Tunsky-Brashich, Offsetting Justice: Protecting Federally-Exempt Benefits from
Garnishment and Bank Set-Offs, 29 BOSTON COLL. THIRD WORLD L.J. 323, 330
n.49 (2009).
177. Schneider, supra note 85, at 415.
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weighed the best evidence a claimant could produce.178 Thus,
a wholesale repeal of the treating physician rule raises
concerns about maintaining individualized assessments in
Social Security cases.
This Part proposes two changes to the current rules
regarding medical opinion evidence to account for potential
adverse impacts. First, the treating physician rule should
still be applied to medical opinions written by a claimant’s
treating psychotherapist or mental health counselor. Second,
the qualified right to subpoena physicians for hearings
should be strengthened to more closely resemble an absolute
right. These two changes will preserve the Agency’s desire to
modernize the rules of medical opinion evidence while
upholding some of the important protections the treating
physician rule provided.
A. The Treating Physician Rule for Mental Health Care
Providers
As discussed above, one of the main justifications SSA
provided for repealing the treating physician rule was, in the
Agency’s words, the “devaluation” of the physician-patient
relationship.179 SSA stated that doctors’ offices have changed
to accommodate high volumes of patients, delegating patient
care to a team of providers instead of one physician.180
Essentially, the Agency argued that physicians and patients
no longer have the kind of intimate, personalized
relationships that deserve the deference of the traditional
treating physician.181 While perhaps compelling in the
context of primary health care, this argument is
178. Id. at 411.
179. Revisions to Rules Regarding the Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 81 Fed.
Reg. 62,560, 62,573 (Sept. 9, 2016) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. pts. 404, 416); see
supra Part II.
180. Revisions to Rules Regarding the Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 81 Fed.
Reg. at 62,573.
181. Id. In the January 2017 notice of final rules, the Agency cited several
medical journals.
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unpersuasive in the context of psychotherapy and mental
health counseling. Psychotherapy involves detailed
discussion of the most intimate details of a person’s life. The
importance
of
a
quality
relationship
between
psychotherapists and their patients is recognized not only in
the field of psychology, but also by the law. A claimant’s
psychotherapist undoubtedly still provides the “unique
perspective” and “detailed, longitudinal” view sought from a
treating source.182
In psychological literature, the psychotherapist-patient
relationship is called the “therapeutic alliance.”183 The very
nature of the term “alliance” implies a thorough and
cooperative relationship.184 According to a publication of the
American Psychological Association, an effective alliance
requires “trust, understanding[,] and belief from the
client.”185 Furthermore, the psychotherapist must maintain
an “acceptable and adaptive” explanation of the client’s
conditions,186 a requirement echoing the §§ 404.1520c &
416.920c supportability test.187 Patient engagement in the
alliance is also important. Patients who are confident in and
committed to a “positive, valuable [,] and purposeful”
relationship with their therapists attain more positive
treatment results.188

182. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2), 416.927(c)(2).
183. LYNNE KNOBLOCH-FELDERS, PHD, THE FAMILY INSTITUTE AT
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY, THE IMPORTANCE OF THE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE
THERAPIST 1 (2008), https://www.family-institute.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/csi_
fedders_relationship_with_therapist.pdf.
184. Alliance, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM DICTIONARY, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/alliance (last visited May 26, 2020).
185. A. Brownawell & K. Kelley, Psychotherapy is Effective and Here’s Why,
MONITOR ON PSYCHOL., Oct. 2011, at 14, 14.
186. Id.
187. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(c)(1), 416.920c(c)(1) (stating that medical
opinion evidence is more persuasive if it contains relevant “supporting
explanations”).
188. Robert L. Hatcher & Alex W. Barends, Patients’ View of the Alliance in
Psychotherapy: Exploratory Factor Analysis of Three Alliance Measures, 64 J.
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Given its beneficial impact on treatment outcomes, the
therapeutic alliance is something that should be fostered by
the law. Indeed, the importance of the psychotherapistpatient relationship is already acknowledged in federal
courts. For example, a psychotherapist-patient privilege is
recognized under the Federal Rules of Evidence.189 In federal
proceedings, claims of privilege are governed by common law
interpreted “in the light of reason and experience” of the
federal courts.190 Privilege doctrine provides for the exclusion
of otherwise highly relevant evidence from trial in order to
“protect interpersonal relationships outside of the
courtroom.”191 While many privileged relationships have
been recognized across U.S. jurisdictions, only a few have
been officially recognized by the Supreme Court. These
relationships include attorney-client, marital relationships,
and critically for this analysis, psychotherapist-patient.192
The Supreme Court first recognized the psychotherapistpatient privilege in Jaffee v. Redmond. That case revolved
around the fatal shooting of Ricky Allen by Illinois police
officer Mary Lu Redmond.193 During discovery, the petitioner
became aware that Redmond engaged in fifty counseling
sessions with a licensed social worker after the shooting.194

CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 1326, 1331–32 (1996).
189. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996).
190. FED. R. EVID. 501 (1974); see also Christine P. Bartholomew, Exorcising
the Clergy Privilege, 103 U. VA. L. REV. 1015, 1021 (2017).
191. EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE:
EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES § 1.1 (3d ed. 2019), Westlaw WIGEVPV.
192. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 1; Kenneth S. Broun, Giving Codification a Second
Chance—Testimonial Privileges and the Federal Rules of Evidence, 53 HASTINGS
L.J. 769, 781–82 (2002).
193. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 4. The petitioner, administrator of Allen’s estate,
brought a civil suit against Redmond alleging deprivation of Allen’s civil rights
through use of excessive force. Id. A number of factual disputes arose between
the parties during litigation. For example, while Redmond claimed the shooting
was lawful because Allen was threateningly wielding a knife, the petitioner
claimed Allen was unarmed when the incident occurred. Id.
194. Id. at 5.
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Redmond refused petitioner’s request for production of the
treatment notes from those sessions, claiming they were
protected by psychotherapist-patient privilege.195 The
District Court was not swayed by this argument, but
Redmond’s claim to privilege was vindicated by the Seventh
Circuit and subsequently by the Supreme Court.196 In its
holding, the Supreme Court likened the newly found
psychotherapist privilege to the marital and attorney-client
privileges, stating the relationship “depends upon an
atmosphere of confidence and trust.”197 By protecting
communications from disclosure in a courtroom, the law
encouraged the development of the “willingness and ability
to talk freely” required for successful psychiatric
treatment.198 Furthermore, the Court found the
psychotherapist privilege served crucial public interests,
stating in no uncertain terms that “[t]he mental health of our
citizenry, no less than its physical health, is a public good of
transcendent importance.”199
Although the justifications for evidentiary privileges
differ from those for the treating physician rule, Jaffee still
illustrates why the treating physician rule should be
preserved for psychotherapists. The stakes in Jaffee were
extremely high. The counselor’s treatment notes, after all,
could have shed light on whether a man was wrongfully
killed by a police officer. And yet, the Court still found
exclusion of the evidence was warranted by the compelling
public policy interests in facilitating effective mental health
treatment. The Supreme Court’s reasoning in this case cuts
sharply against SSA’s suggestion that treating physician
relationships no longer have a place in the modern
healthcare delivery apparatus, insofar as psychotherapists

195. Id.
196. Id. at 6, 9–10.
197. Id. at 10.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 11.
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are concerned.200 To the contrary, Jaffee suggests that the
relationship between psychotherapists and their patients
maintains a special place in society. In the context of Social
Security Disability law, treating sources who have this kind
of relationship with a claimant can still provide the unique
perspective sought by the treating physician regulations
applied to pre-2017 applications.201
Additionally, compared with a treating psychotherapist,
a consulting source’s opinion may be particularly unreliable
in the context of mental health. People with mental illness
face great levels of societal stigma.202 In a 2012 article,
Professor Christopher Pashler explained the myriad burdens
carried by claimants with stigmatized disabilities during the
disability adjudication process.203 Specifically, a claimant
may use coping mechanisms which impair his ability to
communicate about his condition with his treating physician,
an adjudicator, or his own attorney.204 Stunted
communication may result in an underdeveloped record that
negatively impacts disability adjudication.205 Expanding on
Professor Pashler’s argument, it follows that a claimant who
is guarded around his own physician or lawyer will be even
more unwilling to communicate with a consulting physician,
especially a consultative examiner. More often than not, the
consultative examiner is a stranger to the claimant:206 it is

200. Revisions to Rules Regarding the Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 81 Fed.
Reg. 62,560, 62,573 (Sept. 9, 2016) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. pts. 404, 416).
201. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527, 416.927 (2018).
202. See, e.g., Heather Stuart, Fighting the Stigma Caused by Mental
Disorders: Past Perspectives, Present Activities, and Future Directions, 7 WORLD
PSYCHIATRY 185, 185–88 (2008).
203. See Christopher E. Pashler, Mirror, Mirror on the Wall: Stigma and
Denial in Social Security Disability Hearings, 43 U. MEM. L. REV. 419 (2012).
Professor Pashler’s article focuses on the stigma faced by claimants with obesity,
but he discusses stigma in the context of mental illness as well.
204. Id. at 478.
205. Id.
206. See WITTENBURG, supra note 78, at 26–27.
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someone paid by the government to complete the
administrative record. By contrast, as discussed above, a
claimant’s own counselor or psychologist will have worked to
build trust and foster an open dialogue necessary for
psychological treatment. Thus, these treatment sources
should be presumed more reliable than a consulting
physician who did not have an opportunity to break through
the communication barriers faced by claimants with a
stigmatized mental health condition.
The solution is simple: require that Agency adjudicators
give deference to a treating psychotherapist’s opinion about
the claimant’s mental health conditions. The presumption in
favor of the treating psychotherapist’s conclusions could still
be rebutted by applying the §§ 404.1520c & 416.920c
consistency and supportability factors. This solution would
ensure, for example, a psychologist who has formed a
therapeutic alliance with the claimant is presumed more
reliable than a psychological consultative examiner, who
only examines the claimant once for the sole purpose of
producing a report. However, if substantial medical evidence
contradicted the treating psychologist’s conclusions, an
adjudicator could find that the opinion fails the consistency
and supportability tests and rely on the consultative
examiner’s opinion instead. In this case, the adjudicator
would still be required to explain how he considered the
psychologist’s treatment relationship with the claimant.
Significantly, this approach is consistent with Jaffee and
privilege doctrine as currently applied under the Federal
Rules of Evidence. While courts continue to apply the
psychotherapist-patient
privilege,207
a
generalized
physician-patient privilege has never been declared.208
207. See, e.g., United States v. Fattah, 914 F.3d 112, 178–82 (3d Cir. 2019);
United States v. Blue, 340 F. Supp. 3d 862 (D.S.D. 2018).
208. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 602 n.28 (1977) (“[P]hysician-patient
evidentiary privilege is unknown to the common law.”); Cappetta v. GC Servs.
Ltd. P’ship, 266 F.R.D. 121, 126 (E.D. Va. 2009); In re Grand Jury Subpoena John
Doe No. A01-209, 197 F. Supp. 2d 512, 514 (E.D. Va. 2002) (“But no federal
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Likewise, the rules proposed here for amending the treating
source rule would not apply outside of the mental health
context. For the opinions of primary care physicians and
specialists outside of mental health, the rules for weighing
medical opinion would apply as written under the current
regulations.209
SSA has expressed concerns about laborious articulation
requirements,210 and it is true that the changes proposed
here could impose such requirements. This is because the
ALJ would need to provide an explanation whenever he
chooses to reject a treating psychotherapist’s opinion.
However, courts have previously imposed additional duties
on Agency adjudicators when a claimant’s mental illness is
at issue. For example, in the context of a disability hearing,
the ALJ has a heightened duty to fully develop the
administrative record where a claimant “may be mentally ill
and thus unable to protect her own interests.”211 Just as an
ALJ must exercise greater diligence in developing the record
of a mentally ill claimant, she should similarly take care
when weighing the medical opinion evidence in the record.
While the changes proposed here would create an
articulation burden for adjudicators, the burden is justified
because it is limited to opinions from mental health care
providers. Ultimately, these modifications would maintain
the core of SSA’s changes to the rules for weighing opinion
statute creates a physician-patient privilege, and the federal courts have not
recognized such a privilege.”); Jenna Phipps, State of Confusion: The Hipaa
Privacy Rule and State Physician-Patient Privilege Laws in Federal Question
Cases, 12 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 159 (2007).
209. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c, 416.920c (2018).
210. That is, the requirement that an ALJ provide detailed explanations for
the weight afforded to an opinion. See Revisions to Rules Regarding the
Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 81 Fed. Reg. 62,560, 62,572 (Sept. 9, 2016) (to
be codified at 20 C.F.R. pts. 404, 416).
211. Struck v. Astrue, 247 F. App’x. 84, 86 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Tonapetyan
v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2001)); see also Marinez v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., 269 F. Supp. 3d 207, 215 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (“The obligation to develop the
record is enhanced when the disability in question is a psychiatric impairment.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Pashler, supra note 203, at 470.
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evidence while preserving deference for providers who treat
within the “atmosphere of confidence and trust” so vital to
mental health care.
B. Expansion of the Right to Subpoena Physicians
The first regulatory change discussed above deals with a
modification to the rules regarding weighing medical opinion
evidence. In this Section, I propose a change to a rule
separate from the medical opinion regulations: the rule
establishing a qualified right to subpoena physicians in
disability hearings. For the reasons discussed below,
changing the qualified right to an absolute or near-absolute
right could ensure protections similar to the protections that
used to be provided by the treating physician rule.
The right to cross-examine witnesses during trial is
fundamental to the American system of justice.212 However,
the extent of this right in SSA disability proceedings has long
been a subject of debate among the federal courts. For its
part, the Supreme Court provided meager guidance in the
case of Richardson v. Perales. In an opinion described by
Professor Victor Rosenblum as “a triumph of verbosity over
clarity,”213 Justice Blackmun referred to both a claimant’s
“right” to subpoena a physician and the mere “opportunity”
for cross-examination.214 Subsequently, the circuit courts
split over whether the holding in Perales defined an absolute
right or a qualified right to subpoena physicians for cross212. For criminal defendants, the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses is a
Constitutional right. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. While this right is not explicit in
the Constitution for civil cases or administrative proceedings, judges and scholars
have noted the importance of cross-examination in all contexts. See, e.g., Greene
v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 497 (1959) (“For two centuries past, the policy of the
Anglo-American system of Evidence has been to regard the necessity of testing
by cross-examination as a vital feature of the law.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)) (citing 5 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 1367 (3d ed. 1940)).
213. Victor G. Rosenblum, The Right to Cross-Examine Physicians in Social
Security Disability Cases, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1049, 1049 (1999).
214. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 402 (1971); Rosenblum, supra note
213, at 1049–50.
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examination.215 SSA regulations follow the “qualified right”
approach, maintaining that a claimant’s timely subpoena
request need only be fulfilled if it is “reasonably necessary
for the full presentation of a case.”216
One justification for the qualified approach is the
nonadversarial nature of the adjudication process.217
Regarding disability proceedings, the Supreme Court has
stated that SSA “operates essentially . . . as an adjudicator
and not as an advocate or adversary.”218 Thus, the majority
in Perales was reluctant to ascribe anti-claimant bias to
reporting physicians independently contracted with the
government.219 Because the risk for bias is low, the need for
cross-examination was reduced in a Social Security hearing,
and an absolute right to subpoena was unnecessary. In a
fierce dissent, Justice Douglas balked at this argument,
accusing the government of recruiting “circuit-riding doctors
who never see or examine claimants to defeat their
claims.”220 In a 1999 essay, Professor Rosenblum echoed

215. For example, the Fifth Circuit took an absolutist approach, interpreting
Perales to hold that “by requesting a subpoena, a claimant has the right to crossexamine an examining physician.” Lidy v. Sullivan, 911 F.2d 1075, 1077 (5th Cir.
1990), cert denied, 500 U.S. 959 (1991). Several years later, the Sixth Circuit
rebuked the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation, stating “we do not see why crossexamination should necessarily follow from the filing of a subpoena request that
fails to comply with a regulation requiring that there be some showing of an
actual need for cross-examination.” Calvin v. Chater, 73 F.3d 87, 92–93 (6th Cir.
1996).
216. 20 C.F.R. § 404.950(d) (2018). After the Supreme Court denied certiorari
in Lidy, SSA published an acquiescence ruling laying out the difference between
SSA official policy and the Fifth Circuit’s absolutist approach. See Social Security
Acquiescence Ruling 91-X(5), 56 Fed. Reg. 67,625 (1991). However, the Agency
agreed to apply the absolutist approach in all Fifth Circuit cases. Id.
217. Rosenblum, supra note 213, at 1062–65.
218. Perales, 402 U.S. at 403.
219. Id. at 402–03.
220. Id. at 413. Justice Douglas further reasoned that reporting physicians
were likely to be “defense-minded” and proceeded to lambast the government for
using a “stable of defense doctors without submitting them to cross-examination.”
Id. at 414. Other courts have implied that physicians paid by the government
may be biased against claimants. See, e.g., Broadbent v. Harris, 698 F.2d 407,
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Justice Douglas’s sentiments and called for the recognition
of cross-examination in disability hearings as an “integral
component of fairness” that should not be weakened by
“pretenses of nonadversariality.”221
The repeal of the treating physician rule provides new
perspective to the ongoing debate over the right to subpoena
physicians in disability proceedings. Regardless of whether
Justice Douglas’s accusations were accurate, the treating
physician rule equipped claimants with a tool to overcome
anti-claimant biases from reporting or consulting physicians
if such biases existed. This is because the regulations
required great deference to the claimant’s treating physician,
while generally providing little weight to consulting
physicians and state Agency consultants.222 So, even if an
Agency-paid physician held biases, the claimant could rest
easy knowing his own physician’s report had to be given
controlling weight, or alternatively, an adjudicator had to
explain how the treatment relationship of each physician
was considered.223 In that environment, a qualified right to
subpoena was more justified because of the protective rules
for weighing opinion evidence. For example, if a claimant
was denied the opportunity to cross-examine a consulting
physician, that report would ultimately not be as strongly
weighted as the claimant’s treating physician’s report.
This justification for the qualified approach, however, no
longer exists after the repeal of the treating physician rule.
Under the qualified approach, claimants face a situation
412 (10th Cir. 1983) (“In determining the question of substantiality of evidence,
the reports of physicians who have treated a patient over a period of time or who
are consulted for purposes of treatment are given greater weight than are reports
of physicians employed and paid by the government . . . .”).
221. Rosenblum, supra note 213, at 1065 (“[T]he SSA is about as
nonadversarial as whiskey is nonalcoholic.”).
222. See supra Section II.B.
223. It could be argued that this arrangement simply replaces anti-claimant
bias in favor of pro-claimant bias. While it may be impossible to eliminate biases
entirely, it is more justifiable to permit bias from physicians with the most
thorough understanding of the claimant’s conditions.
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where an adjudicator can both rely on a physician’s report
without acknowledging that physician’s treatment
relationship with the claimant and deny the claimant an
opportunity to cross-examine that physician. Because SSA
removed the protection of the treating physician rule, a
stronger right—though not necessarily an absolute right—to
subpoena should be enforced. For example, Professor
Rosenblum suggests the appropriate solution is shifting the
burden of proof.224 Instead of placing the burden on the
claimant to show the necessity of cross-examination, the
Agency would have to demonstrate through clear and
convincing
evidence
that
cross-examination
is
225
unwarranted.
While this right can be enforced through
new regulations, it can also be enforced judicially through
greater scrutiny of subpoena denials.226

224. See Rosenblum, supra note 213, at 1065.
225. Id.
226. Under the current regulations, a subpoena can be denied if it is not
“reasonably necessary” for the presentation of the case. 20 C.F.R. § 404.950(d)
(2018). Thus, courts could require greater evidence to meet the “reasonably
necessary” standard in light of the treating physician rule repeal.
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CONCLUSION
This Comment has provided a comprehensive overview
of the treating physician rule from its common-law origins to
its repeal. Beginning in the middle of the twentieth century,
courts applied the rule to provide oversight for final Agency
decisions. By 2017, the Agency determined the rule was no
longer helpful in disability decisions and repealed it through
standard notice and comment rulemaking. While there are
persuasive justifications for repealing the rule, further
changes should be considered to protect the individualized
assessment that treating physicians contribute to the
decision-making process.
The disability adjudication process will never be perfect.
As the federal administrative state continues to expand,
agencies must constantly revise and re-examine their rules.
Different values must be balanced and calibrated to keep
consistent with those of society. All things considered, the
repeal of the treating physician rule is a reasonable action in
light of the rapid changes to our healthcare system and high
remand rates. That is not to say, however, that there should
never be a place for the rule. Going beyond just the proposals
of this Comment, SSA must be willing to stay flexible to
accommodate changes to protect fair process for claimants.
Americans entrust the Social Security Administration with
the awesome responsibility of managing social welfare for
the most vulnerable among us. In order to carry out this
duty, the Agency must continue to consider all the tools at its
disposal, including those that may seem old-fashioned or
outdated. We should continue to examine the rules for
weighing medical opinion evidence and change them
accordingly to maximize fairness for beneficiaries.

